PEMBINA BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS

The 1863 Pembina Old Crossing Treaty represents a major turning point in the nation-to-nation relationship between the United States and the Pembina Chippewa and related Chippewa communities. Building on earlier efforts, the U.S. sought to acquire roughly 11 million acres in Northern Minnesota—homelands long held and used by Chippewa peoples, including the Pembina leadership associated with Chief Red Bear Misko-Mukwuh. During these negotiations, Red Bear was assured a reservation, a commitment that became central to later land-rights advocacy because it reflected explicit promises tied to the land cession. To fully understand what the U.S. committed to—and what the Chippewa expected in return—this treaty must be read alongside the 1864 addendum, which clarified key terms not fully addressed at first. Today, the treaty’s legacy underscores enduring Pembina Chippewa claims for the recognition and fulfillment of historic obligations, and it remains a crucial record of both the tribe’s sovereignty and the promises that must be honored.

​

SECTION 1 — What “Old Crossing” was, and why the U.S. pushed for a treaty (1851–1863)

​

Old Crossing (near today’s Huot/Red Lake Falls area) was a major crossing and gathering place along the Red River trade routes. By the 1850s–1860s, traffic between the Red River settlements and St. Paul grew fast, and U.S./Minnesota officials wanted safer passage, clearer routes, and—ultimately—title to land. Historian Ella Hawkinson describes how the pressure came from settlers, merchants, lumber interests, and transportation needs, and how treaty-making was used to “clear” routes and concentrate Native people onto smaller areas. 

 

In 1851, Alexander Ramsey had already tried to negotiate a “Pembina” treaty at Pembina for land title issues affecting settlers and Métis/“half-breeds,” but that treaty was later rejected in Congress—showing how federal politics could derail, reshape, or delay agreements even after tribal leaders negotiated in good faith. 

 

Then, in 1862, Congress authorized another effort: Commissioner of Indian Affairs William P. Dole (with John Nicolay from President Lincoln’s circle) traveled toward the Red River Valley with treaty goods and cattle—but the U.S.–Dakota War (“Sioux Outbreak”) disrupted everything and the treaty plans were abandoned midstream. Pembina and Red Lake leaders had gathered as instructed and waited, consuming their provisions, only to have the promised council collapse. This kind of “show up and be ready, then we cancel” experience matters, because it shaped why leaders demanded clearer commitments and better terms in 1863–1864. 

 

SECTION 2 — The 1863 Old Crossing council: what happened on the ground

​

When negotiations finally opened in 1863, the setting was a formal council: handshakes, chiefs seated in front, pipes lit, long silences, and careful speeches. Hawkinson notes that Ramsey praised the Chippewa for not violating treaties, but the talks were tense and complicated from the start. Fear of punishment for past conflicts and “depredations” was real; leaders also worried about being manipulated through language and translation. When Hole-in-the-Day appeared, the designated spokesman Little Rock initially refused to proceed because he feared “one who talks my own language” could be used as a weapon against them—an early warning that translation and representation were central issues, not side details. 

 

A key early U.S. proposal focused on a “right of way” (safe passage) rather than a full land cession, with $20,000 offered. Leaders rejected it, because a mere right-of-way deal could weaken their jurisdiction, undercut their ability to regulate/toll traffic through their homeland, and postpone (or force) a larger land bargain on worse terms later. Hawkinson emphasizes that chiefs understood how a narrow “route” deal could become a wedge that hollowed out control of the broader territory. 

 

After roughly two weeks of negotiations, the treaty was signed on October 2, 1863. Hawkinson reports that one major Red Lake chief, Matwakonoonind, refused to sign (though officials claimed he gave verbal consent), and she records competing explanations for his refusal—ranging from “pride” (as Ramsey framed it) to the more substantive critique that the treaty did not secure the educational and material protections people were asking for. 

 

SECTION 3 — What the 1863 treaty actually said (plain-language, but accurate)

​

The 1863 treaty (“Treaty with the Chippewa—Red Lake and Pembina Bands”) begins by affirming “perpetual” peace and friendship, then records a massive cession: Red Lake and Pembina leaders ceded “all their right, title, and interest” to a very large described territory in northern Minnesota and into Dakota Territory (the treaty spells the boundary points in detail). 

 

In exchange, the U.S. promised $20,000 per year for 20 years, distributed per capita to enrolled members, with up to $5,000 per year allowed to be reserved for purposes like agriculture, education, and supplies “calculated to promote the prosperity and happiness” of the people. 

 

The treaty also included (1) amnesty for past offenses and (2) a $100,000 fund intended to cover certain trader/steamboat claims and debts—BUT with a significant safeguard: no part of that $100,000 could be paid until cases were reported with proof to the Secretary of the Interior and submitted to Congress for action, and any remainder after valid claims would be added back into annuity funds to be divided upon the annuities. That structure is important, because it shows leaders were not simply “agreeing to pay debts”; they were insisting on oversight and on the idea that leftover money should return to the people rather than disappear into private hands. 

 

The treaty promised additional supports: small annual sums for chiefs, one-time money to help chiefs build houses, and $5,000 for cutting out a road from Leech Lake to Red Lake—an explicit recognition that infrastructure would be built through the region and that the U.S. was responsible to pay for that development tied to the cession. 

 

It also created a “board of visitors” (selected from Christian denominations) to attend annuity payments, inspect improvements, and report annually—an early attempt (however imperfect) at oversight because corruption and manipulation of Indian payments were already well-known dangers. 

 

Finally—and this matters directly for Pembina history—the treaty provided land provisions including:

• 160-acre homesteads (under strict conditions) for adult male mixed-blood/half-breed relatives of the bands who met citizenship and “civilized life” requirements and proved up residence and cultivation. 

• And, critically, 640-acre reservations requested by the people for named leaders: 640 acres near the mouth of Thief River for the Red Lake chief “Moose Dung,” and a like 640-acre reservation for Chief Mis-co-muk-quoh (Red Bear) on the north side of the Pembina River. 

 

That last point is not “tribal lore” or interpretation—it is written into the treaty text itself. It is one of the cleanest, most direct statements you can put on a Pembina Chippewa website: the treaty explicitly recognized Red Bear as a chief signatory and tied a specific reserved tract to him by name. 

 

SECTION 4 — Why leaders rejected the Senate changes, and how the Washington, D.C. push began (late 1863–April 1864)

​

Even before ink dried, many leaders believed the 1863 agreement did not reflect what had been promised or what was understood—especially around education, long-term wellbeing, and protection from trader-driven extraction. Hawkinson documents how Matwakonoonind (a Red Lake chief who refused to sign in 1863) sought counsel from Episcopal Bishop Henry B. Whipple and framed the core issue in survival terms: eastern tribes had sold land and “perished,” and he wanted his people to live. 

 

On October 9, 1863—days after the treaty signing—Matwakonoonind wrote that “Our lands were given up by persons, who had no right to do so, without our consent & that of our warriors & young men,” and he emphasized community goals: a school for children and farming on a larger scale. In the same letter, he explained they had asked their agent to write to “our great father at Washington” because they intended to go to Washington. 

 

At the same time, the treaty went to the U.S. Senate. Hawkinson records that after submission in December, the Senate amended it—specifically changing how leftover money (after trader claims) would be handled—triggering further resistance. In a council with Commissioner Dole on April 7, 1864, the Indians refused to accept the amendment as presented. Whipple arrived in Washington in March 1864 (after the Indian delegation had already gone ahead), and Dole asked Whipple to help craft a revision acceptable to the people. 

 

This is the heart of the “Red Bear goes to Washington” story: tribal leaders pursued federal officials on their own ground to force the United States to face them directly, to correct abuses, and to secure terms that better protected their people. Even when the system was stacked against them, they used diplomacy, delegation, and persistence as tools of survival and sovereignty. 

 

SECTION 5 — The 1864 supplementary treaty in Washington, D.C., and Red Bear’s documented role there

​

The result of that Washington effort was a second agreement: “Articles supplementary…” concluded at the city of Washington, District of Columbia, on April 12, 1864. 

 

This 1864 treaty did several things that are especially important to present clearly on your site:

 

1. It required the Red Lake and Pembina bands to “agree and assent” to the 1863 treaty as amended by the Senate (dated March 1, 1864). 

2. It replaced the 1863 annuity structure with a split that explicitly names the bands: $10,000 annually to Red Lake and $5,000 annually to Pembina, distributed per capita, “during the pleasure of the President.” 

3. It added targeted yearly “goods and practical support” funding for 15 years: $8,000 per year for Red Lake and $4,000 per year for Pembina for items like blankets, cloth, twine, provisions, and farming tools—plainly acknowledging that survival and transition required material resources, not just abstract promises. 

4. It committed the U.S. to provide skilled services for 15 years (blacksmith, physician, miller, farmer) plus iron/steel and carpenter funds, including mills—supports meant to strengthen independence and community stability. 

5. It modified the depredation/claims structure: the text specifies $25,000 to be paid to the chiefs (through their agent) upon ratification (or soon after) so they could purchase provisions/clothing/presents for distribution upon returning home; then it set priority for certain trader/steamboat claims and directed how the remainder would be handled. 

 

 

Red Bear’s trip to Washington, D.C.—we can say this cleanly and documentably without overreaching. The 1864 supplementary treaty is explicitly “concluded at the city of Washington, District of Columbia,” and the official published text lists “Principal Pembina chief,

MISCO-MUKWUH (Red Bear)” among the signers on April 12, 1864. That is written proof that Red Bear is not just a name attached to 1863—he is a documented Pembina leader present for (and signing) the Washington renegotiation that followed tribal resistance to the Senate changes and dissatisfaction with outcomes. 

 

SECTION 6 — A Pembina-centered way to explain “why this matters” today

​

For Pembina Chippewa people, the Old Crossing treaties are not “ancient paperwork”—they are part of the legal record of nation-to-nation dealing in which Pembina leaders were treated as chiefs and negotiators, their homeland was explicitly described, and U.S. obligations were spelled out in writing. The 1863 treaty text records Chief Red Bear as a Pembina chief and promises a specific 640-acre reserved tract connected to him by name; the 1864 Washington treaty then records a separate, band-specific annuity stream for Pembina and shows Pembina leadership (including Red Bear) bringing their case to the federal capital when the first outcome did not protect their people. 

 

A clean, honest Pembina narrative doesn’t need exaggeration: the documents themselves show diplomacy under pressure, land loss tied to U.S. expansion and transportation demands, and tribal leadership using delegation and renegotiation to fight for schools, farming supports, material survival, and fairer administration of money that too often flowed to traders instead of families. That’s the story your readers should walk away with—Pembina persistence, Pembina leadership, and treaty promises that remain part of the United States’ written responsibilities.  

​

SECTION 7: WHAT HAPPENED ON THE GROUND AT OLD CROSSING (SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1863)

 

In late summer 1863, Governor Alexander Ramsey led a U.S. treaty party north and west from St. Paul toward the “Old Crossing” on the Red Lake River (near present-day Huot, Minnesota). The journey was long and logistical-heavy, including treaty goods and supplies gathered along the way, and they reached the Red Lake River crossing on the morning of September 21, 1863. 

 

When the U.S. party arrived, the Red Lake Band was already encamped in large numbers under the Indian agent Ashley C. Morrill; the Pembina group arrived the next day “under Charles Bottineau’s direction.” By September 28, the gathering included hundreds of Red Lake and Pembina people (including many “half-breeds” as the sources of that era termed mixed-ancestry community members), swelling the camp to well over a thousand guests to provision. Ramsey pressed for fast negotiations before supplies ran short—an important detail for understanding the power dynamics and pace of the talks. 

 

The opening council began with ritual handshakes, formal seating, pipes lit in silence, and tobacco and food provided—an encounter of two political cultures. Ramsey opened by condemning the Sioux (Dakota) as a “common enemy” and praising the Chippewa/Ojibwe for honoring treaties, but tensions surfaced quickly. One major moment: when Hole-in-the-Day appeared, Little Rock (Ase-e-ne-wub), the appointed Chippewa spokesman, refused to proceed out of fear that “one who talks my own language is the weapon you are going to use against us,” capturing anxiety over interpreters and manipulation. The bands also feared punishment for past depredations; negotiations only began moving after Ramsey promised to “take away that which squeezes” them—i.e., amnesty. 

 

Ramsey first offered $20,000 for a right-of-way through Ojibwe country; the bands rejected it. Hawkinson explains why the Ojibwe resistance was rational: a narrow “right-of-way” deal could weaken their jurisdictional claims and accelerate settlement pressures. Little Rock’s speeches—sharp, spiritual, and politically direct—argued that settlers were already “wresting these prairies from our hands,” and he framed the issue as theft of food and life, not abstract land. 

 

As negotiations dragged, Ramsey escalated with threats and accusations (including claims about harboring Sioux and challenges to Ojibwe title), while Ojibwe leaders pushed back, asserting their own historical occupancy and warfare that secured the territory. Hawkinson notes that pressure tactics increased as the talks bogged down and that the final push to signatures involved behind-the-scenes work by intermediaries—while also admitting the specific “psychology” used on individual chiefs is “untold” in the record. 

 

SECTION 8: WHAT THE 1863 TREATY ACTUALLY PROMISED (ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE, PLAIN LANGUAGE)

 

Here’s the backbone of the October 2, 1863 treaty, translated into clear meaning while staying faithful to the text.

 

1. Peace and political relationship

   Article 1 states “perpetual” peace and friendship between the United States and the Red Lake and Pembina Bands. 

2. The land cession—what was taken

   Article 2 is the core: the Red Lake and Pembina Bands “cede, sell, and convey” their title and interest in a vast region across northern Minnesota and the Dakota Territory (with boundaries running from Lake of the Woods to Thief River, along rivers, and up toward the international boundary). This is the legal basis for the United States’ later claims over much of the Red River Valley region. 

3. Payment and the annuity structure

   Article 3 promises $20,000 per year for 20 years, distributed per capita across the enrolled members of the bands, with up to $5,000/year allowed to be reserved (at the President’s direction) for things like agriculture, education, and supplies. 

4. Amnesty + a $100,000 “claims” bucket that centered outsiders’ losses

   Article 4 explicitly provides amnesty for “past offences,” but it also sets up $100,000 for claims—especially trader losses at the mouth of the Red Lake River and exactions involving a steamboat on the Red River—requiring audits and reports before payments. In other words, the treaty mixed “forgiveness” with a mechanism that prioritized third-party financial claims and debts. 

5. Chief support money + road funding

   Article 5 authorizes up to $150/year to each chief (from annuities) and a one-time $500 at the first payment so chiefs could build houses, plus $5,000 for cutting out a road from Leech Lake to Red Lake. 

6. A “board of visitors”

   Article 6 creates a federally appointed board (2–3 people) to attend annuity payments, inspect improvements, and report annually—essentially an oversight structure meant to monitor distribution and “moral deportment” of people on reservation land under authority of law. 

7. Liquor prohibition

   Article 7 extends U.S. liquor prohibition laws across the ceded country (until changed by Congress or the President). 

8. Mixed-blood homesteads (160 acres) with strict conditions

   Article 8 promises 160-acre homesteads to certain adult male mixed-blood relatives of the bands—if they had adopted “habits and customs of civilized life,” were U.S. citizens, and met five years’ residence/cultivation requirements. It also forbids scrip and assignment until patent issuance (later changed in 1864). 

9. The Red Bear provision: a 640-acre reservation set-aside

   Article 9 is huge for Pembina history: it sets apart 640 acres for the chief “Red Bear” on the north side of the Pembina River (and 640 acres for “Moose Dung” near the mouth of Thief River). This is an explicit recognition—within the treaty text—of Red Bear’s leadership and a defined land interest tied to Pembina homeland geography. 

 

 

Hawkinson summarizes the ceded area as 9,750,000 acres “as surveyed,” and she notes the treaty’s structure (cash-heavy annuities, claims to traders, chief housing support, mixed-blood homesteads, and the special 640-acre reserves for Moose Dung and Red Bear). 

 

SECTION 9: WHY THE STORY DIDN’T END IN MINNESOTA—THE ROAD TO WASHINGTON, D.C.

 

A critical truth for a Pembina-centered telling is this: the Old Crossing story is not only about cession—it is also about Ojibwe leadership refusing to be rushed into a bad arrangement and then taking the fight to the seat of U.S. power.

 

At the October 1863 signing, Hawkinson reports that “all had signed but one, Matwakonoonind, the head chief.” Different observers gave different reasons; Bishop Henry Whipple’s account emphasized that Matwakonoonind refused because the treaty did not include certain provisions for education and goods that Whipple had urged the bands to demand. 

 

Mādwāgwănōnĭnd then put his objections in writing. In an October 9, 1863 letter to Whipple, he argued that the lands were given up “by persons, who had no right to do so, without our consent & that of our warriors & young men,” and he specifically pressed for a school and stronger farming support—clear statements of political legitimacy and community survival priorities. In that same letter he says directly: “We intend to go to Washington.” 

 

This is the bridge to the Red Bear Washington chapter.

 

Hawkinson states that Whipple visited Washington in March 1864 and that he was “preceded by the Indian delegation.” She also notes that, even during the 1863 negotiations, some chiefs were promised the fulfillment of a request to go to Washington “to see the power of the ‘Great Father.’” 

 

By winter 1863–1864 the treaty was in the U.S. Senate, and amendments were made—especially to how any leftover money after trader claims would be handled. Hawkinson reports that the Senate’s changes led to a crisis: the Indians refused to accept the amendment in a council with Commissioner William P. Dole on April 7, 1864. Dole then asked Whipple for help crafting a revision the bands would accept. 

 

SECTION 10: RED BEAR’S TRIP TO WASHINGTON AND THE 1864 SUPPLEMENT—WHY IT MATTERS FOR PEMBINA

 

This is the clearest documentary proof point: the April 12, 1864 supplementary treaty was concluded “at the city of Washington, District of Columbia,” and it is signed by “Principal Pembina chief, Mis-co-muk-quah (Red Bear).” That signature in that place is your historical anchor that Red Bear was part of the delegation and that Pembina leadership directly negotiated in Washington, D.C. 

 

What the 1864 supplement did (in plain terms):

 

1. It locked in acceptance of the 1863 treaty as amended

   Article 1 says the Red Lake and Pembina bands “agree and assent” to the 1863 treaty as amended by the Senate (March 1, 1864). 

2. It restructured annuities and made them band-specific—and per capita

   Article 2 replaces the old $20,000/20-year structure with $10,000 yearly to Red Lake and $5,000 yearly to Pembina, distributed per capita to members, “during the pleasure of the President” (no fixed 20-year term). That “Pembina share” language is an important point for Pembina identity and recognition in federal paperwork. 

3. It added targeted “goods and development” funding

   Article 3 adds 15 years of annual spending: $8,000/year for Red Lake and $4,000/year for Pembina for items like twine, cloth, blankets, provisions, and farming tools—explicitly connecting treaty obligations to daily survival, clothing production, and agricultural transition support. 

4. It rewired the controversial $100,000 claims fund and promised chiefs “return home” support

   The supplement modifies the old structure so that $25,000 would be paid to the chiefs “through their agent” upon ratification (to buy provisions/clothing/presents for their return), and it gives priority to certain trader and steamboat claims from the remaining pool. Hawkinson explains this reallocation, and she also records a painful follow-up: the chiefs did not receive the promised $25,000 upon ratification and were told an agent would buy goods for them in New York instead. 

5. It changed “mixed-blood land” into “scrip” (if elected)

   The supplement allows mixed-bloods to elect scrip in lieu of the lands in the 1863 treaty—scrip that could be located on lands within the cession (and “not elsewhere”) and would be accepted in lieu of future annuity claims. 

 

 

Why this matters for a pro-Pembina presentation:

 

Red Bear’s appearance as principal Pembina chief in the Washington, D.C. agreement is not symbolic—it is governance in action. It shows Pembina leadership actively responding to flaws and vulnerabilities in the 1863 deal by pursuing a second-round negotiation at the federal center of power, pushing toward clearer band allocations, per-capita distribution, and additional material support (tools, cloth, supplies) that could actually reach families.  

​

SECTION 11: PEMBINA LEADERSHIP IN THE RECORD—RED BEAR AS TREATY CHIEF, DIPLOMAT, AND NAMED LAND-HOLDER

 

The federal treaty text itself identifies Mis-co-muk-quoh (Red Bear) as a “Chief of Pembina” and lists him among the signers of the October 2, 1863 Old Crossing treaty, alongside Ase-anse (Little Shell), Chief of Pembina, plus named Pembina warriors and headmen.  That matters because it establishes (in federal language, on the record) that Pembina political leadership was present and recognized as a governing party to the agreement—not a footnote. The treaty also includes a Pembina-specific land promise: Article IX sets apart a 640-acre reservation for the chief “Red Bear,” on the north side of the Pembina River (paired with a 640-acre set-aside near Thief River for “Moose Dung” of Red Lake).  Whatever later history did or did not deliver, the treaty promise is clear: the United States acknowledged Red Bear’s standing and attached a defined land commitment to the Pembina homeland geography named right in the treaty.

 

In 1863, the treaty’s money and enforcement systems were built to move through federal control: annuities, claims audits, and appointed oversight.  For a Pembina chief, signing wasn’t passive consent—it was a leadership act under pressure, meant to protect people in a moment when the U.S. openly prioritized settlement expansion and “cheap” acquisition of Indigenous land. Even in the critical Minnesota Historical Society scholarship, the 1863–1864 treaties are described as a clash between two competing approaches—one designed to make the “best bargain” for government and outside interests, and another that tried (at least on paper) to provide practical supports like education, tools, and mills.  A pro-Pembina telling doesn’t pretend the deal was fair; it shows Pembina leadership fighting to survive inside an unfair system and insisting—again and again—on what was promised.

 

SECTION 12: THE SENATE STEPPED IN—HOW THE UNITED STATES CHANGED THE DEAL AFTER 1863

 

A key part of the “entire history” is this: the treaty signed at Old Crossing did not simply go straight into effect unchanged. In March 1864, the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty with amendments—and those amendments hit the heart of how money would move and who would control it.  Specifically, the Senate removed the language in Article IV that would have distributed any leftover portion of the $100,000 claims/depredations fund to chiefs, and it replaced that with a structure where the residue would be added to annuity funds and divided equally.  The Senate also added a proviso affecting “scrip”/assignment rules tied to the treaty’s mixed-blood land provisions—tightening control and limiting assignment before patent issuance and proof requirements.  These changes weren’t minor edits; they altered how leaders could protect their communities with discretionary resources and how families could navigate land provisions inside the ceded territory.

 

This is why the Washington chapter is so important. Pembina leaders were not just responding to “a treaty.” They were responding to a moving target—an agreement that the United States modified after the fact, forcing the bands to confront a new reality: accept Senate changes or risk losing everything promised (and possibly facing retaliation through policy and enforcement). The treaty record itself shows that the Senate amendments were later “assented to” on April 12, 1864, after being “interpreted and explained” to the chiefs and headmen named—including Red Bear. 

 

SECTION 13: RED BEAR’S WASHINGTON, D.C. CHAPTER—THE 1864 SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY AND WHY IT EXISTS

 

In 1864, additional treaty articles were concluded in Washington, D.C., and Red Bear is listed as “Principal Pembina chief, Mis-co-muk-quah (Red Bear)” among the signers.  This is not rumor or oral retelling—it’s printed in the treaty publication itself.

 

Why did this happen? Because there was organized resistance to the 1863 outcome, and leaders pushed for stronger provisions. In Ella Hawkinson’s scholarly account (“The Old Crossing Chippewa Treaty and Its Sequel”), she quotes the October 9, 1863 letter from the Red Lake head chief (Matwakonoonind) criticizing how land was given up “without our consent” and pressing for schooling and farming support—then stating plainly: “We intend to go to Washington.”  Hawkinson further notes that Bishop Whipple’s March 1864 Washington visit was “preceded by the Indian delegation,” and she describes how the bands refused to accept the Senate amendment in an April 7, 1864 council with Commissioner Dole—forcing a new negotiation track. 

 

So what did the Washington supplementary treaty actually do—especially for Pembina? It created clearer, band-specific allocations and added concrete supports. Under the 1864 supplementary articles, the United States promised annual payments “during the pleasure of the President” of $10,000 to Red Lake and $5,000 to Pembina, distributed per capita after a formal enrollment of members.  It also promised (for 15 years) annual expenditures of $8,000 for Red Lake and $4,000 for Pembina for goods that were directly survival-linked: twine, cloth (calico/linsey), blankets, provisions, and farming tools, plus “other useful” items.  And it promised services—blacksmith, physician, miller, farmer—plus iron/steel and funds tied to carpentry and mills. 

 

The Washington, D.C. agreement is the documentary evidence of Pembina leadership engaging the U.S. government at the highest level available, pushing for clearer Pembina allocations and practical provisions meant to reach families—not just paper promises.

 

SECTION 14: BROKEN DELIVERY, OVERSIGHT, AND WHY PEMBINA ADVOCACY DIDN’T END IN 1864

 

A pro-Pembina telling also has to name the truth that shows why treaty rights remain a living issue: even when treaty language promised specific benefits, implementation could be delayed, redirected, or withheld. Hawkinson records one of the clearest examples: the 1864 “sequel” reduced the claims pool from $100,000 to $75,000 and stated that the $25,000 difference would be paid to chiefs (through their agent) upon ratification to buy provisions, clothing, and presents for people returning home—yet Hawkinson notes that the chiefs did not receive the promised $25,000 when they ratified, and they were told an agent would buy goods for them in New York instead.  In other words: even after traveling, negotiating, and signing, the bands still had to fight the machinery that could “re-route” what was promised in their name.

 

This is also why oversight became part of the treaty system. Hawkinson explains that the treaty’s execution involved a “board of visitors” (including Bishops Whipple and Thomas L. Grace and Thomas S. Williamson) empowered to inspect books, letters, and amounts of goods and money and to examine annuity goods and payments.  But oversight did not erase the deeper structural conflict. Hawkinson describes the 1863–1864 treaty process as a conflict between policies: one aligned with settlers, merchants, and railroad builders and proud of acquiring land “at so low a rate per acre,” while another argued for more explicit provisions (schools, agriculture, sawmills) as “protection.”  That conflict is the background for why Pembina descendants still point back to these documents today: the record contains specific promises (like Red Bear’s 640 acres on the north side of the Pembina River) and specific systems for payment and support—and the record also shows how quickly those promises could be reshaped or mishandled by federal power.